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Abstract
Can investors with irrational beliefs be neglected as long as they are rational on average?
Do their trades cancel out with no consequences on prices, as implicitly assumed by tradi-
tional models? We consider a model with irrational investors, who are rational on average.
We obtain waves of pessimism and optimism that lead to countercyclical market prices of risk
and procyclical risk-free rates. The variance of the state price density is greatly increased.
The long run risk-return relation is modied; in particular, the long run market price of risk
might be higher than both the instantaneous and the rational ones.
1. Introduction
Most neoclassical asset pricing models rely on the assumption that market participants
are rational and maximize their expected utility under the true probabilities of uncertain
economic states. There is however mounting evidence for the presence of traders with biased
beliefs in the markets. How does the presence of these participants a¤ect the behavior of
nancial markets ?
It is widely argued that the presence of these traders can be neglected. The rst main
argument is based on the work of Milton Friedman (1953), and asserts that irrational traders
need not be considered since they will be eliminated in the long run. Indeed, their trading
on wrong beliefs leads them to lose their wealth, and since these traders dont survive, they
cannot inuence the long run behavior of nancial markets. The second main argument for
neglecting behavioral participants relies on the fact that they should be rational on average;
there is no reason for a specic systematic bias, hence investors expectations should be on
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average correct, their trades should cancel out, and there should be no impact on nancial
markets. The third main argument relies on an arbitrage-like argument; the actions of the
rational investors should o¤set the actions of the irrational ones. Prices should induce rational
investors (in aggregate) to overweight (relative to market weights) the assets underweighted
by the irrational investors due to their erroneous beliefs, and to underweight the assets
overweighted by the irrational, thereby o¤setting the price e¤ects of the irrational investors.
There is an important body of recent literature questioning the rst argument. In a
general equilibrium setting, Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) show that with
intermediate consumption irrational traders do not survive in the long run. Yan (2008a)
shows that only the trader with the lowest survival index(a function of belief accuracy,
patience and risk aversion parameters) survives in the long run. In particular, if investors
have the same preferences (or if their preferences are independent from their beliefs) and if
at least one agent is rational, then those with incorrect beliefs cannot survive in the long run.
However, the selection process is very slow. Furthermore there are two limits to the rst
argument. On the one hand, Kogan et al. (2006, 2008) show that survival and price impact
are two di¤erent concepts. On the other hand, several agents with di¤erent beliefs may
survive as in Blume and Easley (2009). The aim of our paper is then to question the second
argument: can investors with irrational beliefs be neglected as long as they are rational on
average ? The last section also sheds some light on the third argument.
We consider an equilibrium model with two groups of behavioral investors who are on
average rational and we analyse to what extent these behavioral investors cancel out or
otherwise impact equilibrium characteristics. We nd that this model shares some similarities
with the standard rational model. In particular, in our model, no investor gets eliminated
in the long run, since no investor (or group of investors) is more wrong than any others. All
the agents survive. As in the rational setting, the consumption shares of the agents remain
equally distributed at all dates, which means that none of the agents wins. Finally, the
market price of risk and the risk free rate are on average (over the states of the world) given
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by the market price of risk and the risk free rate of the rational setting.
However, the features of the setting with disagreement are very di¤erent from the features
of the rational setting. The economy is dominated by the pessimistic agent(s) in bad states
of the world and by the optimistic agent(s) in good states of the world. There are then waves
of pessimism and optimism in the economy, a pessimistic wavein bad states of the world
and an optimistic wavein good states of the world. Since pessimism (resp. optimism) is
associated to a higher (resp. lower) market price of risk, we obtain a market price of risk
that is high (low) in bad (good) states of the world. Note that this result is consistent with
observed countercyclical variations in the equity premium. Indeed, there is evidence that
the equity premium is time varying and as underlined by Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
equity risk premia seem to be higher at business cycles troughs than they are at peaks.
For analogous reasons, we obtain that the risk free rate is lower during recessions and higher
during expansions. This is consistent with observed behavior since empirical studies have
conrmed that the short term rate is a procyclical indicator of economic activity (see e.g.
Friedman, 1986, Blanchard and Watson, 1986). Moreover, in our model, both the market
price of risk and the risk free rate exhibit mean reversion, which is consistent with the ndings
of, e.g., Fama and French (1988).
We also obtain specic features for long term returns. The discount rate (i.e. the rate of
a zero coupon bond) converges to the pessimisticdiscount rate, i.e. the discount rate that
would prevail if the pessimistic agents had the whole endowment of the economy. This result
holds even though the instantaneous risk free rate is at all times given by the rational rate on
average (over the states of the world). This is due to the fact that as maturity increases, the
zero coupon bond becomes more and more desirable as a hedging instrument against very
bad states of the world for the pessimistic agents, who then exert stronger inuence on its
equilibrium prices. As far as risky assets are concerned, we nd that, when the volatility is
not too high, the expected rolled over return (i.e. the expected return of investing one Euro
in the asset and rolling it over) converges to the return that would prevail in the economy
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populated by the more optimistic agents only. This is due to the fact that the optimistic
agents overestimate the expected return of the risky asset and when the volatility is not
too high, holding the risky asset between time 0 and a given time in the far future is more
attractive for them, as a hedging instrument against endowment risk. The long term return
is then higher than in the standard rational setting and higher than the instantaneous return.
The long term risk premium is also higher than the rational long term risk premium and
than the instantaneous risk premium. It is higher than both the long term risk premia in
the optimistic and in the pessimistic economy1. In other words, the presence of irrational
traders modies the long term relation between risk and return and introduces a distortion
between the long term and the short term risk-return tradeo¤.
We obtain that disagreement (with aggregate rationality) induces more variance on the
state price density than the rational setting, which is interesting in relation with Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991, 1997). The state price density is no longer lognormal2. This is consistent
with the empirical literature on the state price density extracted from assets prices (see, e.g.
Jackwerth and Rubinstein, 1996, or Aït-Sahalia and Lo, 1998).
Our main model considers the setting with two groups of agents, logarithmic utility
functions, and constant belief parameters. We analyse the robustness of our results to other
specications of the utility functions. For general power utility functions, we show that our
results remain essentially true. We also obtain additional results on the volatility of the stock
whose dividends are given by the aggregate endowment, which is uctuating and whose level
can deviate from the standard rational level. On the contrary, we show that our results
do not hold for exponential utility functions. Indeed, the waves of optimism and pessimism
result from the uctuations in the (relative) levels of absolute risk tolerances (which are given
by the consumption shares in the case of power or logarithmic utility functions). For CARA
utility functions the relative levels of risk tolerance do not uctuate. In particular, we obtain
1Whereas the instantaneous risk premium is an average of the optimistic and of the pessimistic risk premia
and is on average given by the rational instantaneous rate.
2It is a mixture of lognormal distributions.
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that the market price of risk is constant and given by the standard rational market price of
risk3. We also consider more complex forms of disagreement, and in particular we consider
the case where the investors may switch from pessimism to optimism and conversely. We
show that our results pertain as long as there is some persistence in optimism and pessimism.
Moreover, in general models of disagreement for which there is not necessarily a persistence
in the individual biases, we show that we obtain results that are locally of the same nature.
We nally analyse if our results are robust to the presence of a third group of rational
investors. Apart from the survival issues, the results remain qualitatively the same. This
provides an answer to the third main argument presented above for neglecting behavioral
investors. O¤setting actions by rational investors do not typically su¢ ce to cause the price
e¤ects of wrong beliefs to disappear. This conclusion, drawn from Fama and French (2008),
is extended here to the case of unbiased beliefs.
Levy et al. (2006), Duchin and Levy (2009) and Yan (2008b) are also interested in the
impact of unbiaseddisagreement on prices or more generally on equilibrium characteristics
and are closely related to our work. Levy et al. (2006) show that if investors have hetero-
geneous but unbiased beliefs about the expected returns, the homogeneous CAPM pricing
holds. Duchin and Levy (2009) analyse the impact of disagreement on the return variances
in a mean-variance setting. More precisely, their paper shows that contrary to the disagree-
ment on the mean, unbiased disagreement on the variance has systematic pricing e¤ects. Yan
(2008b) analyses the impact of independent biases in investors demand functions on assets
prices. He rst shows that independent biases a¤ect prices if investors demand functions are
non linear functions of the bias (as in the case studied by Duchin and Levy, 2009). Then
he shows in a two period setting that, even if the demand function is linear in the bias, the
uctuation of the wealth distribution leads to stock return negative autocorrelation. Our
paper is the rst to analyse the dynamics as well as the long run properties of unbiased
disagreement models.
3This case is essentially the continuous time analog of Levy et al. (2006).
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Related papers also include Abel (1989), Cabrales and Hoshi (1996), Calvet et al. (2002),
Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Berrada (2006), Jouini and Napp (2006,
2007), and Gollier (2007), all of which deal with the equilibrium characteristics in a hetero-
geneous belief framework. Our paper is to be contrasted to the works of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003), Dumas et al. (2009), Li (2007) and David (2008) who all consider specic
models of belief divergence and updating, while our aim is to explore the impact of noisy
beliefs, independently of a specic dynamics for belief formation. Our paper is also to be
contrasted to the strand of disagreement literature in which investors learn from prices as in
e.g., Admati (1985), Biais et al. (2009) and DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998).
All proofs are in the Appendices (Appendix I for the main model, Appendix II for the
extensions).
2. The model
We consider a continuous-time pure exchange Arrow-Debreu economy, with a single con-
sumption good and two risk averse agents (or groups of agents) trying to maximize their
expected utility from future consumption. We assume that both agents have the same utility
function for consumption and the same time preference rate, but can di¤er in their subjective
beliefs about the future of the economy. A ltered probability space (
; F; (Ft) ; P ) describ-
ing uncertainty is given and each agent has a von Neumann Morgenstern utility for future
consumption of the form
Ui (c) = E
Qi
Z 1
0
exp ( t)u (ct) dt

where  represents the time preference rate parameter, u is the common utility function,
and the subjective belief of each agent is represented by the subjective probability mea-
sure Qi, equivalent to the initial probability P . We let M i denote the density of Qi with
respect to P , i.e., dQi
dP
= M i: Letting (M it ) denote the density process M
i
t  E [M i j Ft] ;
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the utility of agent i for the consumption stream c can be written in the form Ui (c) =
E
R1
0
M it exp ( t)u (ct) dt

:
We let e denote the aggregate endowment process in the economy. We make the as-
sumption that the processes e and M i satisfy the following stochastic di¤erential equations
8><>: de

t = e

tdt+ e

tdWt
dM it = iM
i
tdWt
whereW is a standard unidimensional4 ((Ft) ; P )-Brownian motion, (; ) 2 (R+)2 are given
constants and i is a stochastic process (i (t; !)) : This is roughly the most general model of
belief divergence in a di¤usion setting5. The assumption on e means that e is a geometric
Brownian motion with drift. In such a context, Agent 1 and Agent 2 both know that the
volatility parameter is given by  but have di¤erent beliefs about the constant growth rate
: By Girsanov Theorem, we have
8><>: de

t = (+ 1) e

tdt+ e

tdW
1
t
det = (+ 2) e

tdt+ e

tdW
2
t
where for i = 1; 2; W it  Wt  it is a Brownian motion under Qi; which means that Agent 1
believes that the aggregate endowment growth rate is given by 1  +1; whereas Agent 2
believes that it is given by 2  +2 and both agents agree on the volatility parameter :
The parameter i =
i 

then measures investor is error in his perceived economic growth
(normalized by the level of risk)6. In this model, an agent is irrational at time t and in state
4For the sake of simplicity, we only consider one source of risk. The results can be generalized to
multidimensional sources of risk.
5Indeed, ifM i is a positive martingale process, the fact that it can be written in the form dM it = iM
i
tdWt
for some adapted process (i) is then just a regularity assumption.
6The fact that both agents agree on the volatility parameter is implied by the assumption that the
individual probabilities Qi are equivalent to the initial one P . This assumption is quite natural. Note that
if the Qi were absolutely continuous with respect to P and not equivalent, and if there existed an event A
with a positive probability for Agent 1 and a zero probability for Agent 2, equilibrium could not be reached
since the demand of Agent 1 would be innite in event A. Moreover, as already noticed by Basak (2000),
or Yan (2008a), this parametrization is consistent with the insight from Merton (1980) that the expected
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!; if i (t; !) 6= 0; optimistic if i (t; !) > 0 and pessimistic if i (t; !) < 0:
We assume that the agents are on average rational, i.e. that 1 (t; !) =  (t; !) and
2 (t; !) =   (t; !). We also assume that individual endowments denoted by ei are the
same with e
i
= 1
2
e: This amounts to assuming that at each date and state of the world,
beliefs and wealth are independent and implies that both the ex-ante unweighted and the
ex-ante wealth-weighted average beliefs are rational.
An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium relative to the beliefs M i is dened by a positive density
price process q and a pair of optimal consumption plans (ci )i=1;2 such that markets clear,
i.e., 8><>: c

i = ci

q;M i; e
i

P2
i=1 c

i = e

where ci (q;M; e)  argmaxE[R T0 qt(ct et)dt]0E
hR T
0
Mt exp ( t)u (ct) dt
i
:
In order to deal with asset pricing issues, we suppose that agents can continuously trade
in a riskless asset and in risky stocks. We let S0 denote the riskless asset price process with
dynamics dS0t = r
f
t S
0
t dt: Since there is only one source of risk, all risky assets have the same
instantaneous Sharpe ratio and it su¢ ces to focus on one specic risky asset. In order to
better analyse the instantaneous as well as the long term risk return tradeo¤, we consider
a risky asset S with given volatility level7 s; and with dynamics dSt = St [sdt+ sdWt] :
The risk free rate process rf ; as well as the stock return drift s are to be determined
endogenously in equilibrium.
3. Constant belief parameters and log-utility functions
In this section we consider constant belief parameters i. This setting is the most simple
and natural extension of a standard rational model where all agents know that the true
growth rate is a constant  to the case with disagreement (with on average rational beliefs);
return is harder to estimate than the variance.
7Note that by market completeness such an asset with a given volatility level always exists.
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one agent believes that the growth rate is  +  and the other believes that it is   
: The restriction implied by such a modelling is that one group of agents systematically
overestimates the growth rate while the other group of agents systematically underestimates
it. This restriction is consistent with the interpretation of the bias on the beliefs as a
behavioral bias characterising the behavior of the individual towards risk, like the individual
distorsions of the underlying probability distributions, introduced in the recent decision
theory literature. With such an interpretation, an individual is more or less pessimistic
in the same way as she is more or less risk tolerant or impatient8. The choice of constant
parameters can also model tastes for assetsas in e.g. Fama and French (2008). In this case,
a positive  would correspond to the agents who like the asset and a negative  to the agents
who dislike the asset. For simplicity we start by considering logarithmic utility functions9.
We analyze in the next section more general belief parameters and utility functions.
In such a setting, it is easy to obtain that there exists a unique equilibrium given by
c1 =

M1
M1 +M2

e; c2 =

M2
M1 +M2

e; (3.1)
q =

1
2
M1 +
1
2
M2

exp ( t)

1
e

: (3.2)
We let    1  c

1
e denote the consumption share of agent 1: The consumption share of
agent 2 is then given by  2  1     c

2
e : Note that  i also corresponds to the individual
relative level of absolute risk tolerance given by   u
0(ci )
u00(ci )
P2
i=1 
u0(ci )
u00(ci )
 1
.
In the standard rational case, the consumption share of each agent is time and state
8If the bias corresponds to a behavioral bias having decision theoretical foundations, then it is consistent
to suppose that the bias is persistent, one group of agents remaining optimistic and the other group of
agents remaining pessimistic. Our notion of optimism/pessimism coincides in our setting with the notions
of optimism/pessimism adopted by e.g., Yaari (1987), Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) and Dieciedue and
Wakker (2001). Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) relate it to the notion of First Stochastic Dominance, while
Yaari (1987) and Diecidue and Wakker (2001) relate it to the notion of Monotone Likelihood Ratio. These
notions coincide in our setting.
9Note that, in the logarithmic setting, the price of the stock whose dividends are the aggregate endowment
is given by St = 1e

t ; hence there is no impact of unbiased disagreement on the price of this stock. This is
not true in the general power utility setting.
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independent and equal to 1=2: In the case with one rational and one irrational agent, we
know (see e.g. Kogan et al., 2006) that the irrational agent becomes extinct in the sense
that her consumption share converges to 0 and that the consumption share of the rational
agent converges to 1 (almost surely). More generally, if there is a bias on average, one agent
being more wrong than the other, the more rational agent winsin the very long run: when
j1j > j2j then  1 (t) converges to 0 and  2 (t) converges to 1 almost surely (see, e.g., Yan,
2008a). The economy ends up being dominated by the more rational agent. As expected,
the situation with no bias on average is very di¤erent.
Proposition 3.1. Distribution of Consumption Shares
1. For all time t; the random variable (t) is symmetric with respect to 1
2
:
2. Each agent has a larger share of aggregate endowment in the states that she thinks
more probable. The consumption share  (Wt) is an increasing function of the Brownian
motion Wt, with limW!0  (W ) = 0 and limW!1  (W ) = 1.
3. The stochastic process  (t) exhibits mean-reversion and satises the following Stochas-
tic Di¤erential Equation
d (t) = 2 (1  ) [ (1  2) dt+ dWt] :
Proposition 3.1 implies in particular that the consumption shares of both agents are on
average (over the states of the world) given by the standard rational consumption shares.
None of the agents wins. At all times, consumption is equally shared in the sense that
the consumption shares of the agents are identically distributed. Both agents survive in the
long run. These results are due to the fact that no agent is more wrong than the other10.
However, we obtain that at the equilibrium, each agent has a larger share of aggregate
consumption in the states that she thinks more probable, which is intuitive. These are
10In Yan (2008a)s terminology, the agents have the same survival index.
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the good states of the world for the optimistic agent and the bad states of the world for
the pessimistic agent. This implies that the consumption shares are biased in favor of the
optimistic agents in the good states of the world, and in favor of the pessimistic agents in
the bad states of the world. Moreover, for very good (resp. very bad) states of the world,
the optimistic agents (resp. pessimistic) dominate the economy, i.e. their consumption share
is near one. The average belief uctuates then between the optimistic and the pessimistic
ones and there are waves of optimism and pessimism as in fads models (Cochrane, 1991).
The main content of Point 3 is the mean reversion property. Even though each consump-
tion share either converges to 0 or 1 asymptotically along each trajectory, consumption shares
have a tendency to revert to their average level of 1/2. The reason for the mean reversion of
consumption shares is the following. We know by Euler Equations that at the equilibrium the
marginal utilities are equal at each time and state of the world, i.e. M1u0 (c1) = M
2u0 (c2) :
Consider a time and state of the world with a high consumption share (i.e. above average)
for the optimistic agent c1 > c

2. Then u
00 (c1) > u
00 (c2) and an increase in aggregate endow-
ment will more favour Agent 2 than Agent 1, thereby reducing the consumption share of the
optimistic agent, which tends to revert to its average level of 1/2.
Note that the individual consumption shares  i also correspond to the individual wealth
shares of agent i; given by E
hR +1
t
qsc

i (s) ds
i h
E
hR +1
t
qse

sds
ii 1
; so that all the results
obtained on the instantaneous consumption shares also hold for the wealth shares in the log
setting.
3.1. Risk-free rate and market price of risk
The fact that the consumption shares or the wealth shares (which represent the relative
levels of risk tolerance) uctuate in time and in state of the world has an impact on asset
pricing, that we now analyze. We recall that in the standard rational setting the risk free
rate and the market price of risk (MPR  s rf
s
) are time and state independent and given
by rf (stdd) = +   2 and MPR (stdd) = :
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Proposition 3.2. Risk free rate and market price of risk
1. The risk free rate and the market price of risk are given by
rft = r
f (stdd) +  ( 1 (t)   2 (t))  (3.3)
MPRt = MPR (stdd)  ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) ; (3.4)
2. The market price of risk is countercyclical: it is a decreasing function of the Brownian
motion W that governs aggregate endowment.
3. The risk free rate is procyclical: it is an increasing function of W .
4. The risk free rate and market price of risk stochastic processes exhibit mean reversion.
They satisfy the following Stochastic Di¤erential Equations
dMPRt =  42 1 (t)  2 (t) [(MPRt   E [MPRt]) dt+ dWt]
drft =  42 1 (t)  2 (t)
h
rft   E
h
rft
i
dt  dWt
i
:
The distributions of the market price of risk and of the risk free rate are symmetric with
respect to the standard quantities, and we retrieve on average over the states of the world
the standard market price of risk and the standard risk free rate, which is consistent with
the fact that our agents are on average rational. However, the behavior of the risk free rate
and of the market price of risk is inherited from the behavior of the consumption shares (or
the risk tolerances). Letting ri;ft andMPR
i denote the risk free rate and the market price of
risk that would prevail if Agent i had all the endowment, we easily obtain that the risk free
rate and the market price of risk lie inside the range bounded by the two limiting cases11,
i.e. rf 2 r2;f ; r1;f and MPR 2 [MPR1;MPR2] : Since we know that the consumption
shares are biased in favor of the optimistic agents (resp. pessimistic agents) in good states
11In the case of power utility functions (see the next section), the result on the market price of risk remains
valid, i.e., MPR 2 MPR1;MPR2 but the risk free rate can lie outside the interval r2;f ; r1;f  :
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of the world (resp. bad states of the world), we obtain that the risk free rate and the market
price of risk are biased in favor of the risk free rate and the market price of risk of the
optimistic (resp. pessimistic) agents in good states of the world (resp. bad states of the
world). Moreover, positive (resp. negative) shocks lead to an increase of the weight of the
optimistic (resp. pessimistic) agents. This leads to the results of Points 2 and 3. The market
price of risk is countercyclical. This result is consistent with the observed variations of the
equity premium. Indeed, there is evidence that the equity premium is time varying and as
underlined by, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999) equity risk premia seem to be higher at
business cycles troughs than they are at peaks. For analogous reasons, we obtain that the
risk free rate is lower during recessions and higher during expansions. This is also consistent
with observed behavior since empirical studies have conrmed that the short term rate is a
procyclical indicator of economic activity (see e.g. Friedman, 1986, Blanchard and Watson,
1986). Moreover, we obtain in Point 4 that the market price of risk and the risk free rate
exhibit mean reversion.
3.2. State price density moments
We know that in the standard rational setting, the state price density, given by qstdd =
exp ( t)u0 (e), is lognormal with log qstdd  N

   + 2
2

t; 2t

. In our setting, the
state price density is a weighted average of the state price densities that would prevail if one
of the agents had all the endowment, i.e. q = 1
2
q
1
+ 1
2
q
2
where q
i
= exp ( t)M iu0 (e) :
Each state price density q
i
is lognormally distributed and the state price density in our
setting q is a mixture of two lognormal distributions. In particular, it is not lognormal as
in the standard setting, which is consistent with the empirical literature on the state price
density extracted from assets prices (see, e.g. Jackwerth and Rubinstein, 1996, or Aït-Sahalia
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and Lo, 1998). Furthermore, direct computation gives us
E [qt ]
E [qstdd(t)]
= cosh (t)  1
V ar [qt ]
V ar [qstdd(t)]
=
e(
2 2)t   1 + e(2+2)t cosh (4t)  cosh (2t)
2 (e2t   1)  1:
which means that disagreement increases the mean and the variance of the state price density.
Numerically, the impact on the mean is very small. However, the impact on the variance
is much more important. For instance, if we take  = 1:8% and  = 3:6%; as in Mehra
and Prescott (1985), and  = 0:5 (which means that Agent 1 anticipates a growth rate
of 3.6% while Agent 2 anticipates a zero growth rate) we obtain that the variance of the
state price density in the model with disagreement is 26 times the variance in the standard
model12. These results are interesting in light of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991, 1997)
and in particular on the bounds imposed by security market data on the mean and the
standard-deviation of the state price density.
In fact, as seen through Equations (3:1) and (3:2) our state price density is the same as
in an equivalent homogeneous economy with aggregate endowment e and with a consensus
belief M  1
2
(M1 +M2) and it is easy to check that, for the consensus agent, aggregate
endowment follows the dynamics
det = (+  1    2) etdt+ etdWQt (3.5)
where WQ is a Brownian Motion for the consensus agent. For the consensus agent, the
instantaneous expected growth rate is then time varying and stochastic and evolves smoothly
between the two bounds 1 and 2: From the consensus agent point of view, this regime
shifting model can be seen as a smooth version of the regime switching model of e.g.,
David and Veronesi (2002). Moreover, Equation (3:5) implies that the consensus agent is
12With the same gures we have E[q

t ]
E[qstdd(t)]
= 1:0006:
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optimistic in good states of the world and pessimistic in bad states of the world even though
there is no bias at the aggregate level since E [(+  1    2)] = : We easily get that
EQ [log et ] = t(  122), and V arQ [log et ] = 2t+ t222: From the consensus agent point of
view, the mean is the same and there is then more variance on the distribution of aggregate
endowment, the additional variance being the result of the drift variations. As argued by
Rubinstein (1976), the variations of the state price density capture the corrections for risk
in assets valuation. The additional variance of the state price density is then directly related
to the additional variance at the consensus agent level.
3.3. Long term returns
We now turn to considerations about long term returns of riskless and risky assets. In the
standard setting, for all time T; the rate of return associated to a zero coupon bond maturing
at time T is given by R (stdd) = +   2 and is equal to the instantaneous risk free rate.
The instantaneous return for asset S, whose volatility level is given by S; is constant and
given by S (stdd) = +   2 + S: The expected risky asset cumulative return (i.e. the
expected return of investing one Euro in the asset and rolling it over) between time 0 and time
T is given by CRST (stdd)  1T logE [ST ] = 1T logE
h
exp
n
rfstdd + S   
2
S
2

T + SWT
oi
:
It is constant and given by the instantaneous return S (stdd).
In our setting, we have already seen that the instantaneous risk free rate is the con-
sumption share weighted average of the instantaneous rates that would prevail if one of
the agents had all the endowment (Proposition 3.2, Point 1). We easily obtain that the
instantaneous return for asset S at time t has similar properties, and is given by S (t)
= + 2+S+( 1    2)  (   S) : In particular it is on average equal to the rational
instantaneous return S (stdd) and uctuates between the two bounds. The next proposition
identies the long run behavior of the discount rate RT    1T logE [qT ] ; of the cumulative
return on the risky asset CRST  1T logE [ST ] and of the risk premium rpST  1T logE [ST ] RT
in our setting.
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Proposition 3.3. 1. The asymptotic discount rate is given by R1  limT RT =  +
  2   : It is the discount rate that would prevail with only the pessimistic agent
present in the economy.
2. For an asset whose volatility is given by 0  S  ; the asymptotic cumulative return
is given by CRS1  limT CRST = S (stdd)+ (   S) with S (stdd) = + 2+S:
It is the cumulative return that would prevail with only the optimistic agent present
in the economy. In particular, CRS1  CRS (stdd) and CRS1  S (t) for all t:
3. For an asset whose volatility is given by 0  S  ; the asymptotic risk premium is
given by rpS1  limT rpST  limT
 
1
T
logE [ST ] RT

= rpS (stdd) +  (   S) + ,
where rpS (stdd) = S: In particular, it is higher than the standard asymptotic risk
premium and higher than the instantaneous risk premium.
This means that the long run discount rate is always the pessimistic rate. We have seen
in Proposition 3.2 that the risk free rate is on average given by the rational rate since for
all t; E
h
rft
i
= +   2: We have also seen that none of the agents vanishes and that the
distribution of the risk free rate is, at each date, symmetric with respect to the rational rate.
However, the discount rate converges to the discount rate of the more pessimistic agent.
This apparent contradiction is due to the fact that the behavior of the instantaneous risk
free rate rft is driven by the consumption shares at time t. As already seen, since no agent
wins, at all times the risk free rate is on average given by the rational rate. Concerning the
discount rate, as maturity increases, the zero coupon bond, as a hedging instrument against
very bad states of the world, becomes more and more desirable for the pessimistic agent,
who then exerts stronger inuence on its equilibrium price.
As far as risky assets returns are concerned, the long term cumulative return for low
volatility assets is higher than the (instantaneous or long term) return in the standard
setting. It is also higher than the instantaneous return and it is given by the cumulative
return of the asset in an economy made of the optimistic agent only. The interpretation
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is the following. The optimistic agent overestimates the expected return of the risky asset
and when the volatility is not too high (compared to the volatility of aggregate endowment),
holding the risky asset between time 0 and a given time in the far future is more attractive
for her, as a hedging instrument against endowment risk. The optimistic agent consequently
exerts a stronger inuence on its equilibrium cumulative return.
Both e¤ects impact the risk premium. The asymptotic risk premium is higher than the
standard asymptotic risk premium. It is higher than both the optimistic and the pessimistic
risk premia and also higher than the instaneous risk premium. A possible interpretation is
that there is in the long term an additional risk, a sentiment risk due to disagreement, that
modies the standard risk return relation.
4. Other Utility Functions and more general belief parameters
The aim of this section is to consider if the results of the previous section are robust to more
general utility functions and/or to nonconstant belief parameters.
4.1. Other utility functions
We have considered in the previous section logarithmic utility functions. Consider now
the more general setting of power utility functions with u0 (x) = x 1=: We provide in the
Appendix all the results in this setting and we sum up here the main conclusions. As
shown in e.g. Jouini and Napp (2007), there is an aggregation bias. However, modulo this
bias, the conclusions remain essentially valid. As far as survival issues are concerned, we
obtain that both agents survive and there is a sort of stationarity (see Appendix, II-B). At
each date; there is a pessimistic bias in bad states of the world and an optimistic bias in
good states of the world (Appendix, II-C). As far as asset pricing results are concerned, we
obtain (Appendix, II-D) that the market price of risk is countercyclical and exhibits mean
reversion. The risk free rate is procyclical (in very good and very bad states of the
world). The discount rate is still converging to the discount rate of the pessimistic agent in
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the long run. Moreover, we obtain in the power utility setting results on the volatility of
the stock whose associated dividends are the aggregate endowment (Appendix, II-E). In the
myopic logarithmic setting, this volatility is necessarily given by the volatility of aggregate
consumption, as in the standard rational setting. For more general power functions, it is
time and state varying. In the long run, the volatility converges to the volatility of aggregate
consumption. The stock price dividend ratio St
et
is also time and state varying and converges
in the long run with the same probability either to the price dividend ratio of the pessimistic
economy or to the price dividend ratio of the optimistic economy.
Note that our results are not robust to an exponential specication of the utility function,
in particular those on asset pricing13. In fact, in the exponential setting, as in the logarithmic
or power setting, the risk free rate and the market price of risk are given by the risk tolerance
weighted averages of the individual risk free rates and market prices of risk (modulo the
bias). In the case of exponential utility functions (CARA), the relative levels of absolute
risk tolerances are constant and lead to constant market price of risk and risk free rate. We
emphasize that the uctuations in the market price of risk and in the risk free rate are due
to uctuations in the levels of risk tolerances (and not in the levels of consumptions shares,
even if both notions coincide in the case of power utility functions).
4.2. More general belief parameters
We have considered so far a model of disagreement, in which the disagreement is on average
zero but also constant in time and in states of the world, i.e. i 2 R: We now analyse
the robustness of our results to more general specications of disagreement, with belief
parameters that are no longer constant but stochastic processes (i (t; !)) : We still assume
that the agents are on average rational, i.e. that 1 (t; !) =  (t; !) and 2 (t; !) =   (t; !) :
In such a setting the consumption shares are given by  i (t; !) = M
i
M1+M2
; which means
13Adapting the results of Jouini and Napp (2007, Section 4.1) to the case of unbiased disagreement, we
get that the market price of risk in the exponential setting is given by the standard market price of risk
MPR =MPR(stdd) and the risk free rate is given by the standard risk free rate modulo a (constant) bias
due to beliefs dispersion, rf = rf (stdd)+ 12
2.
19
that, as before, the consumption share is high in states of the world that the agent thinks more
probable. The consumption share of Agent 1 is greater than the consumption share of Agent
2 in states ! that she overweights, more precisely, in states ! such that
R t
0
 (s; !) dWs > 0:
Note that on average we have E
hR t
0
 (s; !) dWs
i
= 0: The quantity
R t
0
 (s; !) dWs in a way
measures the degree at which nature has favoured (or disfavoured) Agent 1 with respect to
Agent 2 between date 0 and date t. In other words there is a bias towards the agent who
has been less wrong between date 0 and date t, given the evolution of the economy during
the same period. We can show (see the Appendix) that, as in the model with constant
parameters, the consumption share of Agent 1 satises the following SDE
d 1 (t) = 2 1 2 [ ( 2    1) dt+ dWt] :
There is then mean reversion in the dynamics of the consumption shares, in the sense
that when the consumption share is high, it has a tendency to decrease. Moreover, we have
d log

1(t;!)
2(t;!)

=  (t; !) dWt; which means that there is locally a shift in favor of (against)
optimistic agents following good (bad) news.
As far as asset pricing issues are concerned, it is easy to obtain that we have
rft = r
f (stdd) +  (t; !) [ 1 (t; !)   2 (t; !)] ;
MPRt = MPR (stdd)  [ 1 (t; !)   2 (t; !)]  (t; !) :
The states of the world for which the market price of risk is high are the states of the world
for which the risk free rate is low. The market price of risk (resp. the risk free rate) is lower
(resp. higher) in states of the world that are good for the (locally) optimistic agent (in
the sense that her consumption share is high). These are not necessarily the goodstates
of the world, since the market price of risk is lower than the standard market price of risk
when
R t
0
 (s; !) dWs

 (t; !) > 0:
Notice that after a good shock
R t
0
i (s; !) dWs

increases for the optimistic agent leading
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to a decrease of the market price of risk. There is then a shift towards lower (resp. higher)
market prices of risk following good (bad) news. Similarly, there is a shift towards lower (resp.
higher) risk free rates following bad (good) news. This means that in the general setting, we
retrieve locally the same type of results as in the model with constant parameters, i.e. the
fact that good news decrease the market price of risk and increase the risk free rate.
5. Extension: a Model with Irrational as well as Rational Agents
The aim of this section is to consider to what extent our results on irrational traders are
robust to the presence of rational traders on the markets. For this purpose, we consider a
model that is analogous to the main model except that there are now three agents : Agent
1, overestimating the instantaneous expected growth rate by , Agent 2, underestimating
the instantaneous expected growth rate by  and Agent 3, rationally expecting the instan-
taneous growth rate : We suppose that the three agents have the same initial endowment
(1=3) e: The individual consumption shares are given by  i  c

i
e =
M i
M1+M2+1
, whereM3  1:
The survival properties are di¤erent in this setting. Indeed, as shown in Yan (2008), it is
easy to obtain in this setting that  3 (t) converges to 1 almost surely, i.e. only the rational
agent survives14 . This implies that instead of converging to an economy with two possible
scenarios (one pessimistic scenario and one optimistic scenario), the economy converges to
an economy with the rational scenario only. In particular, the instantaneous risk free rate
converges to the rational risk free rate and the market price of risk converges to the rational
market price of risk. The other results remain essentially true. The consumption shares  1 (t)
and  2 (t) have the same distribution for all t; and none of the irrational agents eliminates
the other one. The instantaneous prices are on average given by the rational prices, i.e.
E [MPRt] = MPR (stdd) and E
h
rft
i
= rf (stdd) : We get that 1(t)
2(t)
= exp (2Wt) ; hence
 1 >  2 if and only if log et > E [log e

t ] ; i.e. in good states of the world:
14We have for i = 1; 2; M it = exp
h
t

i
Wt
t   
2
i
2
i
which converges to 0 when t increases, since Wtt !t!1 0
a.s.
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This means that there is an optimistic bias (in terms of consumption shares) in the good
states of the world and a pessimistic bias in the bad states of the world. We still get that
the economy is dominated by the pessimistic agents in the very bad states of the world and
dominated by the optimistic agents in the very good states of the world and that there is
a shift in favor of the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) agents following a good (resp. a bad)
shock. The market price of risk, which is given byMPRt =MPR (stdd) ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) ;
is countercyclical. The risk free rate, which is given by rft = r
f (stdd) +  ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) 
is procyclical. The yield curve still converges to the discount rate of the more pessimistic
agent (even though the risk free rate converges to the rational rate). Finally, the state price
density is still a mixture of lognormal distributions, which generates more variance.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we study the impact on the behavior of nancial markets of irrational traders,
when they are on average rational. We consider as our main model a model with logarithmic
utility functions, two groups of agents, and constant biases but we show that the results
pertain to more general power utility functions, to more than two groups of agents, to
the presence of an additional group of rational investors and to more general models of
disagreement.
To sum up, the model with unbiased disagreement is very di¤erent from the standard
rational model, although they share common features. As in the standard setting, all agents
survive. Moreover, at all date, the consumption shares have the same distribution. Finally,
at all date, the prices remain on average the same as in the standard rational setting. These
properties are consistent with the fact that disagreement is unbiased. However, the following
features make the setting with unbiased disagreement very di¤erent from the rational setting
and particularly interesting.
 There are waves of optimism and pessimism
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 The market price of risk is countercyclical (higher in recessions and lower in expansions)
 The risk free rate is procyclical .
 The market price of risk and the risk free rate are mean reverting.
 The yield curve is decreasing (at least in the long run).
 The long run risky assets return is possibily higher, as is the long term risk premium.
 The state price density has greater variance.
 State price densities are mixtures of lognormal distributions.
 Volatility may be uctuating.
We emphasize that the obtained properties only result from the (absolute) risk tolerance
uctuations and not on specic learning dynamics. Note also that we do not impose short
sales constraints.
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APPENDIX I
Proof of Proposition 3.1
1. According to Equation (3:1) ; we have  1 =
(M1t =M2t )
1+(M1t =M2t )
hence  1 (t) =
exp(2Wt)
1+exp(2Wt)
and  2 (t) =
exp( 2Wt)
1+exp( 2Wt) with Wt  N (0; t) : The consumption shares have then the same
distribution and it is symmetric with respect to 1/2; in particular, we have E [ i (t)] = 1=2:
2. According to Equation (3:1) ; we have  i = 12
M i
M
with M  1
2
(M1 +M2) : Agent i has
a larger share of aggregate consumption when M i M , i.e. in the states of the world that
she overweights. Since  1 (t) =
exp(2Wt)
1+exp(2Wt)
; we have  1 (t) = f (Wt) with f (x) =
exp(2x)
1+exp(2x)
:
It is immediate that f is increasing with lim 1 f = 0 and lim+1 f = 1:
3. We have  1 (t) = f (Wt) with f (x) =
exp(2x)
1+exp(2x)
: Itôs Lemma and elementary algebra
give the following Stochastic Di¤erential Equations
d 1 (t) = 2
2 1 (1   1) (1  2 1) dt+ 2 1 (1   1) dWt
= 2 1 2 [ ( 2    1) dt+ dWt] ;
d 2 (t) =  2 1 2 [ ( 2    1) dt+ dWt] :
It is immediate that the drift of  1 is positive for  1 < 12 and negative for  1 >
1
2
: The process
 1 exhibits then mean reversion around 12 :
Proof of Proposition 3.2
1. Since q = (exp( t))  1
2
M1 + 1
2
M2

(e) 1 ; rf =  q and MPR =  q ; we obtain
through Itôs Lemma
rft = +   2 +  ( 1 (t)     2 (t) ) ;
MPRt =    ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) :
2. According to Equation (3:4) , the market price of risk is lower in states of the world
where  1 (t) >  2 (t) and decreases with  1 (t) : Proposition 3.1 concludes.
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3. According to Equation (3:3) ; the risk free rate is higher in states of the world where
 1 (t) >  2 (t) and increases with  1 (t) : Proposition 3.1 concludes.
4. This is a direct consequence of Equation (3:4) and of Point 3 of Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
1. We can apply Jouini et al. (2008) to our specic setting by taking i = , 1 =  and
2 =  : We rederive this result here for the sake of completeness. We have
Rt =  1
t
logE

1
2
M1t +
1
2
M2t

exp ( t) (et ) 1

:
We then have Rt = +   2  1t log

1
2
exp ( t) + 1
2
exp (+t)

: The rest is immediate.
2. Let S(stdd)  + 2+S:We have S (t) = S(stdd)+  (   S) ( 1    2) and
1
T
logE [ST ] =
1
T
logE

exp
Z T
0

S (t) 
2S
2

dt+ SWT

: (6.1)
Let us rst prove that 1
T
logE [ST ]  S(stdd)+ (   S) : Since by hypothesis  (   S) 
0; we have S (t)  S(stdd) +  (   S) ; hence
1
T
logE [ST ]  1
T
logE

exp
Z T
0
S(stdd) +  (   S) 
2S
2

dt+ SWT

 S(stdd) +  (   S) :
We have by Equation (6:1)
1
T
logE [ST ]
= S(stdd) +
1
T
logE

exp
Z T
0

 (   S) ( 1    2)  
2
S
2

dt+ SWT

= S(stdd) +
1
T
logE

exp
Z T
0

 (   S) exp (2Wt)  1
exp (2Wt) + 1
  
2
S
2

dt+ SWT

:
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We introduce the probability measure P such that dP
dP
jFt= exp

SWt   
2
S
2
t

: We have
1
T
logE [ST ] = S(stdd) +
1
T
logEP

exp
Z T
0

 (   S) exp (2Wt)  1
exp (2Wt) + 1

dt

Letting W t  W   St; we know that W is a Brownian motion under P and we obtain
1
T
logE [ST ]
= S(stdd) +
1
T
logEP
"
exp
(Z T
0
 
 (   S)
exp
 
2W t + 2St
  1
exp
 
2W t + 2St

+ 1
!
dt
)#
= S(stdd) +
1
T
logE

exp
Z T
0

 (   S) exp (2Wt + 2St)  1
exp (2Wt + 2St) + 1

dt

:
We let Yt  exp(2Wt+2St) 1exp(2Wt+2St)+1 : We want to show that lim inf 1T logE [ST ]  S(stdd) +
 (   S) or equivalently that lim inf E
h
exp
n
 (   S)N

1
N
R N
0
Ytdt
oi1=N
 exp ( (   S)) :
By Hölders Inequality, we haveE
h
exp
n
 (   S)N

1
N
R N
0
Ytdt
oi1=N
 E
h
exp
n
 (   S)

1
N
R N
0
Ytdt
oi
:
The quantity Yt =
exp t(2Wtt +2S) 1
exp t(2Wtt +2S)+1
converges almost surely towards 1 since Wt
t
converges
towards 0 almost surely. Furthermore Yt is bounded. By Césaros Lemma, we have that
1
N
R N
0
Ytdt also converges almost surely towards 1, hence exp
n
 (   S)

1
N
R N
0
Ytdt
o
con-
verges almost surely to exp ( (   S)) : Now, by Fatous Lemma, we have
lim inf E

exp

 (   S)

1
N
Z N
0
Ytdt

 E

lim inf exp

 (   S)

1
N
Z N
0
Ytdt

hence lim inf E
h
exp
n
 (   S)

1
N
R N
0
Ytdt
oi
 exp ( (   S)) and lim inf 1T logE [ST ] 
S(stdd) +  (   S) :
3. Immediate according to 1. and 2.
APPENDIX II
Results for Power Utility Functions
A. Existence Result
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For general ; if (1  ) (  )   1
2
1

(1  )2 > 0; then there exists an equilibrium
q; (ci )i=1;2

given by
ci =

i (M
i)

1 (M
1) + 2 (M
2)

e; q =
 
1
 
M1

+ 2
 
M2
1=
(e) 1=
for some positive constants (i) with 1 + 2 = 1: For  = 1=2; we have
1
2
=
q
 2+
 2  .
More generally, for  < 1; there is a small bias towards the optimistic investor (1 > 1=2),
and for  > 1; there is a small bias towards the pessimistic investor (2 > 1=2).
B. Distribution of Consumption Shares
1. The random variables  i (t) have the following density functions on [0; 1]
f i(t) (x) =
1
2
p
2t
1
x (1  x) exp 
1
2
h
log
 
x
1 x
  log  i
j
i2
422t
1[0;1] (x)
2. For all t and for i = 1; 2; the median of the distribution of the consumption share
of each agent is given by her initial biased wealth leveli, i.e., we have P ( i (t) > i) =
P ( i (t) < i) = 1=2:
C. Consumption Shares Stochastic Processes
1. The optimal consumption shares are given by  i =
i(M i)

1(M
1)+2(M
2)
. Each agent has a
larger share of aggregate endowment in the states that she thinks more probable. The share
 1 is an increasing function of W .
2. The stochastic processes  i (t) satisfy the following SDE
d i (t) = 2 i j [ ( j    i) dt+ dWt] :
D. Asset Pricing
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1. The instantaneous risk free rate and the market price of risk are given by
rft = r
f
t (stdd) +


( 1 (t)   2 (t))    2 (   1) 2 1 (t)  2 (t) ;
MPRt = MPRt (stdd)  ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) ;
where rft (stdd) =


  2
2

1 + 1


and MPR (stdd) = 

: The quantity  1 (t)  2 (t) converges
to 0 in Probability.
2. The market price of risk is lower in states of the world where  1 (t) >  2 (t) ; i.e. in
good states of the world and higher in states of the world where  2 (t) >  1 (t) ; i.e. in
badstates of the world. The risk free rate is higher in very goodstates of the world and
lower in very badstates of the world.
3. The market price of risk exhibits mean reversion with
MPRt =


   ( 1 (t)   2 (t)) = 

   (2 1 (t)  1) :
4. The discount rate is always converging to the pessimistic rate in the long run. For
 = 1=2; we have for all t;
Rt = 2  32   1
t
log

21 exp  (2t) + 22 exp (2t) + 212 exp 
1
2
2t

;
and R1 = 2  32   2:
E. Volatility
We consider a stock S, whose dividends are the aggregate endowment process, dSt+etdt =
St [sdt+ sdWt].
We consider the case  = 1=2: We suppose that  = 0 and      2 > 0: We have in
the standard rational setting St = 1 2 e

t and S = :We denote by S
1 (resp. S2) the prices
that would prevail if the economy was made of the optimistic (resp. pessimistic) agents only.
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In the setting with disagreement, we get
St = e

t

a 21 + b
2
2 + 2c 1 2

S =  + 2 2

1  b 2 + c 1
a 21 + b
2
2 + 2c 1 2

with a = 1
+ 2 ; b =
1
  2 ; c =
1
+ 1
2
2 2 : In particular, in the long run,
St
et
either
converges to S
1
t
et
or to S
2
t
et
with a probability 1, and S converges to :
Proof of E.
We have
St
=
(et )
2
Mt
Et
Z +1
t
Ms (e

s)
 1 ds

=
et
Mt
Et
"Z +1
t

21M
1
s + 
2
2M
2
s + 212
p
M1sM
2
s
 es
et
 1
ds
#
= et

21
M1t
Mt

Et
"Z +1
t

M1s
M1t

es
et
 1
ds
#
+et

22
M2t
Mt

Et
"Z +1
t

M2s
M2t

es
et
 1
ds
#
+et
0@212
s
M1t
Mt
s
M2t
Mt
1AEt "Z +1
t
 s
M1sM
2
s
M1tM
2
t
!
es
et
 1
ds
#
= et

 21 (t) at + 
2
2 (t) bt + 2 1 (t)  2 (t) ct

with at = Et
R +1
t

M1s
M1t
 
es
et
 1
ds

; bt = Et
R +1
t

M2s
M2t
 
es
et
 1
ds

and ct = Et
R +1
t
q
M1sM
2
s
M1tM
2
t
 
es
et
 1
ds

:
Elementary algebra yields at = 1+ 2 ; bt =
1
  2 ; ct =
1
+ 1
2
2 2 :
Results for more general models of disagreement
We have  1 (t) = f (Xt) with f (x) =
expx
1+expx
and Xt =
R t
0
2 (s; !) dWs: By Itôs Lemma
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and elementary algebra, we get the following Stochastic Di¤erential Equations
d 1 (t) = 2
2 1 (1   1) (1  2 1) dt+ 2 1 (1   1) dWt
= 2 1 2 [ ( 2    1) dt+ dWt]
d 2 (t) =  2 1 2 [ ( 2    1) dt+ dWt]
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